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IN· THE S·UPREME COURT
of the

s·TATE O·F UTAH
HENRIETTA SMITH,
Plaintiff and AppeUant,
-vs.-

Cas·e No.

-~-----

GOLDE·N J. BENNE'TT,
Defendant and Resp·ondent.

STATEMENT OF' FACT'S
In an action arising out of an auto p·edestrian accident which occurred on October 17, 195t, in Salt Lake
City, Utah, the District Court Judge, Honorable Joseph
G. Jeppson, directed a verdict for the defendant upon the
ground that the evidence showed plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence which was a p:roxirnate cause of her
own injury as a matter of law. The question presented .
by the ap~peal is whether the evidence presented sustains
this finding.

Briefly the facts are : The plaintiff, Henrietta
Smith, at the time of the accident, on October 17, 1951
resided between 8th and 9th West at 937 West 2nd South
in S'alt Lake City, Utah (R. 61). ·On the same date she
1
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was employed as a cashier at the Western Co-op. The
Western Co-op is located near plaintiff's residence being
a short distance west and on the opposite, or north side
of the street, within the same ·block. (See Exhibit B which
has been reproduced and included in the brief for the convenience of the court.)
Second South Street in this vicinity is 60 feet wide
including the curbs on both sides of the street and is
divided into two lanes for traffic on the south, two lanes
for traffic on the north, each lane being 10 feet wide, a
cente·r strip 4 feet wide and two parking lanes, each 8 feet
wide on either side of the street (Exhibit B). There is a
driveway immediately adjacent to the Western Co-op, on
the east side of the building which leads out into 2nd
South Street. Starting where this driveway intersects
2:nd South and extending across the street to the south
and slightly west is a marked crosswalk. This cross,valk
intersects the south side of 2nd S.outh at a point 267 feet
from the center of the intersection of 2nd South and 9th
West St.- It is 79~2 feet along 2nd South from the center
of 9th West Street to the next street east, 8th West Street.
(Exhibit B)
There is a street light on the north side of 2nd South
immediately adjacent to the driveway next to the \Vestern c·o-op. There is a street light on the south side of
2nd South in front of plaintiff's residence (Exhibit I~).
At about 6 :05 p.m. on the evening of Oct. 17, 1951,
plaintiff had finished her day's work at the Western Coop. She left the store with her ernployer, Mr. Wright, and
another clerk, Mrs. Ostberg. S:he told \Vrig-ht goodnight
2
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at the door of the store.

~irs.

Ostberg accon1panied plain-

tiff to the drivevn:1Y irrunediately east of the Western
Co-op where they parted company (R. 63).
Aceording to her testimony, plaintiff then proceeded
to the north curb of 2nd South. At that point she looked
to the east 'vhere she sa"\v a car coming from 8th West,
far enough away to allow her to cross (R. 6.5). She then
proceeded to the center of the 2nd South Street keeping
within the bounds of the crosswalk, (R. 65, Exhibit B).
At this p·oint, she looked west and saw a car approaching
between 9th and lOth West almost to lOth West (R. 65).
She then walked east up the middle of 2nd South Street
to a point 45 feet east of the crosswalk ( R. 66). At that
point she stopped, looked west, saw no cars approaching
from the west (R. 103-121-127). F·rom that point she
started to walk to the south toward her home when she
was struck ( R. 103-127) .
One of the p-olice officers who investigated this
accident, Harold A. Peterson, Jr., identified the point
of impact from scuff marks on the pavement 69· feet east
of the eastmost portion of the crosswalk, 14 feet from the
south curb line of 2nd South and 13 feet south of the
south double lines in the center of the street (R. 11). The
defendant's automobile had brush marks on the left front
fender and had traveled 3 feet beyond the point of impact. The lights on defendant's automobile were on (R.
16) and the brakes in working order (R. 16). The left
~ide of the car when it came to rest was about on the
3
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dividing lane between the two eastbound "lanes of traffic
(R. 13, Exhibit B).
Police Office·r W. 0. Cowden interrogated the defendant, Golden J. Bennett, who told him that he observed plaintiff in the -center portion of the street "Talking
in a southerly direction, and that he slowed up and honked
his horn; that he saw the pedestrian hesitate, as if she
was going to stop, so he took his foot off the brake to
proceed ahead; that at about that time she broke and ran.
toward the south curb; that he immediately applied his
brakes, but could not stop before striking plaintiff. Defendant stated he had been traveling about 25 miles per
hour, realized the dangeT about 50 feet from the point of
impact, and had slowed his speed to one mile per hour at
the point of impact (R. 15).
Frank W. Bonner, an independent eye witness testified that he was driving an automobile west on 2nd South
(R. 134) at about 6:10p.m. when he first observed plaintiff about 75 to 80 feet in front of him (R. 137). At that
point plaintiff was just leaving the curb (R. 13()). Rhe
came out over the curb and proceeded on an angle (R.
150) in a southwest direction (R.. 136) (see path traced
on Exhibit B) toward the center of the street (R. 150).
She appeared to be in a hurry and walked or trottPd
(R. 137-150). When she reached the center o.f the ~trPPt
she appeared to hesitate then cut aeross toward her ho1ne
on the south side of the street (R. 150, Exhibit 13). Plaintiff was struck at a point just ~outh of the lin<' dividin~
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the t\YO eastbound lanes of traffic, lanes 1 and 2, on the
south side of 2nd South (R. 135).
The \vitnes8 first noticed the lights of defendant's car
coming east in the outside lane, lane number one, from a
point do\vn 2nd South ( R. 135). He noticed the car again
at a point just \vest of the crosswalk (R. 138). (See point
n1arked FB on Exhibit B.) It was dusk and the street
lights were on. Defendant's car seerned to have turned
a little way into the inside lane, Lane 2, never completely
leaving Lane one, and then to turn back into Lane one
(R. 14:2). The witness placed the speed of defendant's car
at 20-25 or 30 (R. 147) and stated defendant brought his
car to a stop in 3 to 5 feet (R. 140).
Anothe·r independent witness, Charles Henry Sweat,
testified that at the time of the accident he was driving a
car east on 2nd South in the inside lane of travel for eastbound traffic immediately behind defendant's automobile
which was traveling in the outside lane (R. 151-52). l-Ie
testified that he was traveling about 25 miles per hour
and slowed his car to 10 or 15 when he saw plaintiff (R.
160) and that the defendant must have done the same
as the distance between his car and defendant's ren1ained
the same (R. 160).
He first observed Mrs. Smith when she started across
the road (R. 156) fro1n the north edge of the road (It
156). She proceeded in a southeasterly direction toward
her home (R. 157). (See path marked "HS" Exhibit B.)
She stopped in the rniddle of the street and then "'trotted"
into the path of defendant's vehicle (R. 157). The wit-
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ness estimated that when plaintiff started to trot acro:ss
in front of defendant, defendant's car was no further
than five feet fr·om her (R. 157).
The defendant testified that he had left work at the
Lang Company at 11th West and 2nd South (R. 20) at
six o'clock (R. 19). From that point he traveled east on
2nd South in Lane 1 (See Exhibit B) at a speed of :23
miles per hour (R. 21). \Vhen he reached the point sho\rn
as '·'Bl" on Exhibit B, 50 to 75 feet west of the cross\\·alk
(R. 25-2.6) in front of the Western Co-op he saw· ~Irs.
Smith approaching the yellow line in the center of the
street at the point marked "S" of Exhibit 2. He started
to slow the speed of his ear at a point 10 to 15 feet \V{_)St
of the crosswalk (R. 26 marked B2 on Exhibit B). At
that time, Mrs. Smith was at the corner of the street
shown as s.2 on Exhibit B (R. 28). As his car crossed
the crosswalk (B3 on Exhibit B) Mrs. S·mith hesitated
in her c;ourse (at point 83 on Exhibit B) leading defendant to believe she would yield the right of way (R. 30).
He next observed plaintiff when his car was in the position of "B4". Mrs. Sn1ith was still toward the center of
the road at position S4 on E·xhibit B. When his car
reached position "B5" on Exhibit B about 25-30 feet fron1
plaintiff. Plaintiff started to run in front of defendant's
ear ('R. 3'2). Defendant first applied his brakes at position
"B:2" and slowed to 20 miles per hour (R. 24). Assu1ni ng
that Mrs .. S1nith was going to yield the right of way, he
continued to point "B5" at about 20 miles per hour (I~.
33). When plaintiff started across in front of hi~ <'ar,
point "B5" he applied his brakes severely (It 32).
(j
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The defendant te8tified that at point ~•B2" on Exhibit B also 1narked "BH" he honked his horn to warn
plaintiff of the approach of his automobile (R. 35). Before darting in front of his automobile, Mrs. Smith hesitated for a period of 2 or three seconds-plaintiff was
struck by the left front fender of his vehicle (R. 39). He
stated that at no ti1ne did he drive his car into the center
lane, or Lane 2 (R. 42). That he had the lights turned
on on his vehicle (R. -±7). That from the time he left
point ''B5" he traveled about 25 to 30 feet and Mrs.
Smith traveled 13 feet (R. 38).
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defendant, upon the ground
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence i.n failing
to keep a lookout for vehicles and in failing to yield the
right of way to defendant.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POIN·T I.
PLAINTIFF WAS
MATTER OF LAW.

GUILTY

OF

NEGLIGENCE

a.

FAILURE TO KEEP LOOKOUT.

b.

FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY.

AS

POINT' II.
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF HER OWN INJURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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ARGUM.ENT

POIN·T I.
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF HER OWN INJURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW.

We agree with the authorities cited in appellant's
brief to the effect that the question of contributory negligence is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that
jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that they
are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiff was guilty ·of negligence which proximately contributed to cause his own injury. Stri'c:kl·e v. Union Pacific
R. Co., (Utah) 2:51 P (2) 867.
However, the evidence in the record establishes that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
ap-proximately caused her own injury with such certainty
that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary.
Plain tiff was guilty of negligence in the following respects:
a.

FAILURE TO KEEP LOOKOUT.

The evidence shows that this accident happened at
dusk, at 6 :10 p.m. in the evening and that it was not yet
dark. The street was well lighted and the street lights
we·re on. The street was wide open (Exhibit I & J) and
there were no obstructions to plaintiff's vision. The defendant had the lights of his car turned on. Plainti:fT \\'aR
not in a position on the street where she n1ight have PXpected defendant to stop for her. The defendant's ear
8
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had approached a point "\Vhere the in1pact occurred fro1n
a point some blocks we:st. There can be no doubt that the
car "\Yas there to be seen. It is no excuse- for plaintiff to
say she did not see tl1e vehicle when the vehicle was there.
'rhe length of the skid 1narks and the distance the car
traveled after impact show that the defendant was traveling at a low rate of speed. The testimony of the eye
witnesses corroborates this. This evidence can lead us
to only one conclusion; the plaintiff either did not look
for the defendant's vehicle before she cross~d into the
path of this vehicle, or if she did l·ook, plaintiff failed to
heed what she saw.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, Malone v. Vining, 313 Michigan 315, 21 N.E. 2d 144 aptley, defined the
duty of a pedestrian as follows :
"Under present day traffic conditions a pedestrian, before crossing a street or highway, 1nust
(1). make proper observation as to app-roaching
traffic, (2) observe approaching traffic and forn1
a judgment as to its distance away and its speed,
(3) continue his observations while crossing the
street or highway, and (4) exercise that degree
of care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under like circumstances."
The evide-nce in this case conclusively shows that the
· · plaintiff did not exercise the degree of care required
from a reasonably prudent p·erson. ·It logically and naturally follows that such heedless and inattentive conduct was negligence as a matter of law. Numerous courts
including the Utah Supreme Court in similar circumstances have so held.

9
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In Mmgus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d) 493,
a directed verdict was sustained on the grounds of plaintiff's contributory negligence. In concluding that the
plaintiff either did not look or did not make sufficient
or adequate observation, this court said:
"More convincing than the direct testiinony
that decea;s·ed did not look, is the further evidence
that deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate that he was at all aware of the danger presented by defendant's approaching automobile.
He seems to have heen wholly unaware of its approach~ Certainly he did nothing either to warn
his wife, nor to rescue either himself or her from
their position of peril. On this evidence, it n1ust
he said as a matter of law that deceased either
failed to look, or having looked, failed to see what
he should have seen."
In Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719,
pLaintiff and his vvife were crossing the main street of
Logan, Utah, from east to west at a point between intersections. They stopped somewhere over the center of the
highway on the west side ·of the street to allow southbound traffic to pass. Plaintiff was gazing in a southwesterly direction when de.fendant's automobile, approaching from the north struck the plaintiff and injured
him. Plaintiff's wife had seen the impending danger and.
had stepped out of the way. Verdict w~as directed in
favor of. defendant by the lower court and affir1ned on
appeal, the court saying:

"Appellant was aware of the fact that he wa~
taking a chance in crossing the ~trPet at a pla<'e
contrary to law. He should also have known that

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a driYer of a vehicle \vould not ordinarily anticipate the presence of pedestrians on the street at
the tiine and place of the accident. Knowing that
his presence might not be anticipated and knowing that traffic on the west side of the road was
approaehing fron1 the north and with nothing
of importance to distract his attention, it was appellant's duty to ,y·ateh the traffic he knew was approaching his location.
''* * ~· Having omitted to continue to watch,
he failed to exercise the degree of care required
of a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety and
places hi1nself in a position of peril. A greater
degree of care is necessary upon the part of a
pedestrian who undertakes to cross a city street
at a prohibited place than is placed on one who
uses a 1narked crosswalk."

Tysinger v. Cobble Dairy Products, (N.C.) 36 S.E.
(2d) 267:
"Now, then, as to the alleged contributory
negligence of plaintiff's testate, it is sufficient to
say that in crossing the highway at ~a point other
than a marked crosswalk at an intersection it was
his duty to yield the right of way to all vehicles
upon the highway. G.S:. Sec. 20-174 (a). The highway was visible according to all the evidence·, for
at least 300 yards in the direction from which the
truck of the defendant was approaching. And in
leaving the point where he was talking to the witness Everhardt to go toward his home, he necessarily faced in the direction of the oncoming truck.
IIe must have seen the truck .and taken the chance
of crossing or, have been inattentive to the duty
in1posed upon hin1 by law, and started across without looking f.or vehicles on the highway. In either
event, a reading of the evidence leads to the con-

11
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elusion as a matter of law, th-at his own conduct
contributed to his injury and death, unfortunate
and regrettable as it may be."
In Horton, et al v. Stoll, (Cal.) 40 Pac. (2d) 603,
plaintiff, ·a twenty-year old girl, was crossing between intersections not in a pedestrian lane. As she came to the
further west car track first rail, she hesitated and looked
or glanced to the north, but failed to remember what, if
anything, she saw. She w•as under the impression, ho\\'"ever, that she had plenty of time to cross the street. After
taking a step or so, and while she was still on the car
track, she was hit by the left front fender of defendanfs
car coming from the north. In sustaining a non-suit, the
court s·aid;
"We are of the opinion that the facts of this
case show affirmatively that plaintiff failed to
use due care and that she failed in this respect
was the p-roximate 0ause of the injury.
"Had she looked she must have seen defendant's car approaching a few feet away, for she
had taken only a step or two from her position
of safety when she was struck.
"It was plaintiff's duty from the position
she was in upon the highway to yield to defendant
the right of way.
"The only conclusion that can be reaehed
from the evidence is that plaintiff failed to take
the trouble to properly look for autoinobiles on
the side of the street as she crossed, or that she
sa'v the automobile and for so1ne unexplainPd
reason stepped directly in its path. Under either
theory she failed to use due care, \vhieh precludP~
her rights of recover.''

12
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In Reid v. Ow·e~ns, 98 Utah 50, 93 Pac. (2d) 680, this
court in holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a 1natter of la-\v said:
._ . A.. case verY si1nilar to the instant case is
~-i.ndrus v. S. J. Boudreaux & Son, La. App. 158
So. 679. There the plaintiff was foreman of about
twelve men engaged in roadwork, about half of
them being _on each side of the road, but not on the
paved portion, as defendant's truck approached.
The paYJ.naster had just pulled up· his car across
the road from the plaintiff who p-roceeded to cross
the road diagonally to the paymaster's car. The
plaintiff testified he did not see defendant's truck,~
but the court noted a probable inference that he
saw it fron1 the fact that he had 'walked unusually
fast, rushed or run.' But this was in1material as
the court found: 'The on-coming truck was in full
open view of the road and was hound to have been
seen by the plaintiff had he looked down the road
at the ti1ne of starting across.' The court then
held the plaintiff to the knowledge he would have
had if he had looked and held: 'It was his duty
to look for his safety before starting across. He
must be regarded as having seen the truck whethe:r
he looked or not'; and the court approved the
holding of the lower court that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 'He
should not have thus voluntarily, heedlessly, and
thoughtlessly left a safe place and exposed himself to an obvious danger by trying to cross the
road under the circumstances which attended such
a movement.'
"As the court said in Andrus v. S. J. B'Oudreaux & Son, supra, he 'vas chargeable with what
he would have seen had he looked. He either proeeeded 'vithout looking or, having seen the ap-

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

proaching car, he chanced crossing in face of the
hazard. The latter would clearly, under the circumstances, have been negligence on his part. The
approaching vehicle was at the instant of deceased's entry onto the pavement so near that no
prudent person would attempt crossing in front of
it. The more reasonable inference is he did not
see the car. But had he looked he would have seen
it, and he is charged with knowledge of what he
would have seen had he the duty to look. \V e
think that he clearly had such duty.
* * *
"The presence of the barriers on the untraveled portion of the highway and of piles of
dirt on -the side of the pavement, and the presence
of workmen, would not justify deceased in assmning that the driver of a vehicle will, be.cause· of the
presence of these elements, so drive as to avoid
striking one who, without looking, darts out into
the path of the vehicle. We conclude that under
the evidence viewed most favorably to the plaintiffs the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law."
In the recent case of Cox v. Thompson (Utah) 254 P.
(2) 1047, a wrongful death action, the evidence was that
the deceased had started across a poorly lighted highway in Orem, Utah, at night and had traveled more than
halfway across the highway, when his wife called to hin1,
whereupon he turned and walked directly into the path of
a southbound automohi'le. The trial court directed the
verdict in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. This court upheld the trial eourts decision
and said:

14
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··On the evidence set forth the trial court correctly found decedent contributorily negligent as
a matter of law. F'roin a fair appraisal of the evidence, reasonable 1nen can draw but one inference
and that inference points unerringly to the
negligence of the decedent. In response from
a call from his wife, decedent who was crossing
east across a p·oorly lighted highway, turned and
walked directly into the path of defendant's
automobile. c·rossing a highway at a point where
there was no marked crosswalk, decedent was
duty-bound to yield the right of way to the vehicle
upon the roadway. See 46-6-79, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This he failed to do. He, in
addition apparently failed to look, or having looked failed to see what he should have seen and
paid heed to it. He said nothing and did nothing
which indicated that he was in any way aware of
the danger presented. Decedent was properly
found negligent as a matter of law."
In this case, as in the cases cited, the plaintiff either
unaware of the app.roach of the defendant's automobile
or heedless of her own safety, left her position of con1parative safety in the center of the street and walked
directly into the path of the defendant's vehicle. Whether
she failed to see the defendant's vehicle, as she herself
testified, or seeing it deliberately crossed in front of the
vehicle, in either instance, she was guilty of negligence as
a 1natter of law.
b.

F AlLURE TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY.

The evidence in this case discloses that the plaintiff
may have crossed the highway where this accident occurred in one of two ways. She may have started across
the highway within the marked crosswalk and p·roceeded
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to the center· of the highway. From that point she turned
and walked up the center of the highway 45 feet and then
diagonally toward the point of impact, some 69 feet east
of the crosswalk at a point apparently between the two
lanes of eastbound traffic. The two eye witnesses testified that the plaintiff crossed the highway more or less in
a diagonal line from the driveway in front of the \\7 estern Co-op to the point of impact. Under either version,
plaintiff was not within the crosswalk or did not have
a preferred position upon the highway.
Section 46-6-79 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
"Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any
point other than within a marked crosswalk or
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the
roadway."
It is clear that as soon as plaintiff left the center of
the highway and proceeded directly into the path of
eastbound traffic, she failed in her duty to yield the right
of way as provided by law. Her failure to so yield the
right of way was clearly negligent and it is readily seen
that had she not continued her course, this accident would
not have happ,ened.
In Fearn v. City of Philad,elphia, (Pa.) 182 Atl. G:1-t,
the court said :
"When a pedestrian traverses a street between intersections, since he is not crossing at a
place where he is expected to be, he must exerci:-;P
a higher degree of care for his safety; motorist~
are correspondingly held to a less degree of earP.~~
16
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See also Sheldon. v. Ja1nes, (Cal.) 166 Pac. 8, where
the court said :
~'A

greater deg~ree of care is necessary upon
the part of the pedestrian who undertakes to cross
a congested highway other than at the established
crosswalk and especially so if in the act he does
not essay a direct crossing, but pursues a long
diagonal route.
·
"'The observation of ordinary care by such
a pedestrian is not fully performed by merely
looking to the left or right as he steps upon the
street. The observance of that care is imperative
upon him during all of the time that he is crossing.~,

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF WAS
MATTER OF LAW.

GUILTY

OF

NEGLIGENCE

AS

The principal argument of the appellant appears
not to be that the plaintiff was not negligent in the manner in which she proceeded across 2nd S-outh Street,
but that the trial judge should have submitted the issue
of whether or not her negligence was a proximate cause
of her injuries to the jury. Is the causal connection between the negligence of the plaintiff and her own injuries
so patent as to p,reclude the submission of that issue to a
jury~

In Sec. 6127 of Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, it is stated:
"Although one may be under the duty to look
before crossing a city street, if he is injured by an
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automobile while crossing and would escape the
consequences of his negligence, he must show that,
even if he had looked, the accident would still have
happened.''
If the plaintiff had seen the defendant's vehicle,
which was plainly visible, or seeing it had yielded the
right of way to that vehicle, the accident of which plain. tiff complains certainly would not have happened.

In Burgess v. Salt Lake City railroad contpa.ny, 17
Utah 406, 53 Pac. 1013, plaintiff in crossing Second South
between Main and West Temple Streets looked for westhound street cars, but failed to look for an easbound car
and was injured when he stepped in front of the latter.
There was some evidence that at the place of the injury,
there were flagstones laid flush with the paving blocks
indicating a crossing and also evidence that pedestrians
crossed the street at any place between Main and West
Temple. The court reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial. In holding
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law under the e.vidence, the court said, starting on page
410 of the Utah Report:
"On the other hand, the evidence shows that
the plaintiff incautiously and heedlessly stepped
upon the track, where he received the injury. In
the hurry of the moment, he attempted to cross
the street and track without exercising that care
which a man of ordinary prudence ought to exercise under like circumstances. Had he but used his
senses it is clear that he could have avoided the
accident. This it was his duty to do; and, having
failed so to do, he cannot be heard to eomplain of
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any InJury that resulted froin the failure which
''Tas the proximate cause thereof.
•'·The plaintiff, in crossing the street, was
bound to exercise the same degree of care as that
'vhich it was incmnbent upon the railway comp~any
to exercise.
~'The

car has the right of way in case of meeting a person or vehicles on the track, but each
party, in order to avoid accident, is bound to exercise ordinary care, and such reasonable prudence
and precaution as the surrounding circumstances
may require."

In Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah 369,
86 Pac. (2d) 37, a directed verdict in favor of defendant was affirmed on the grounds that plaintiff was held
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in
standing in a p~destrian lane, but so close to a passing
bus that the overhang of the bus when turning struck
her. The court on page 380 of the Utah Report quoted
Kent v. Ogden L. & Tr. Co., 50 Utah 328, 167 Pac. 666:
"When, as in this case, there can be no doubt
whatever regarding the proximate cause of the
accident, nor any doubt that it was wholly within.
the power of the deceased at any moment before
the coll~sion to have· averted it by merely moving a
foot or two out of the zone of danger, this court
cannot shirk its duty in determining the· result.
* ·* * The deceased's conduct constituted the proximate cause of the injury."

In Trumbley v. Moore, (Neb.) 39 N. W. (2d) 613,
plaintiff was crossing a street between intersections when
struck by the defendant's vehicle. The evidence showed
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that the wheels of the vehicle were straddling the center
line of the road. A verdict for the plaintiff in the lo\\Ter
court was reversed on appeal. The court said:
"It is true that the left wheels of the Hamer
car went over the center line, but there is nothing
to indicate that this was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury. The proximate cause of the
injury was the attempt of plaintiff to cross the
street between intersections without looking, or if
he did look, in not seeing that which was in plain
sight. * * * The evidence reveals nothing 'vhich
would excuse plaintiff's failure to see the Hamer
car and respect the right of way that it had. .A.
right of way means nothing unless persons obliged
to respect it are required to see an approaching
favored car that is in plain sight. Plaintiff wa~
negligent in attempting to cross the street between intersections as he did. Negligence on the
part of the defendant Hamer is not shown by this
record. Under such circumstances plaintiff's own
negligence is the proximate cause of the accident
and there is nothing for a jury to determine. ThP
trial court should have directed a verdict for the
defendants."
In Millig~ v. W ea.re, (Maine) 28 Atl. (2d) 463,
plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries sustained when defendant's car driven by his e1nployeP
knocked him down as he was crossing a highway. The
point of the three lane highway at which the aceident occurred was an intersection which was 1narked with stop
lights. Since traffic waiting for the lights was blocking
the crosswalk, plaintiff walked between (·ars and into the
center lane, which was reserved for left turning, and into
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the path of defendant's rapidly approaching auto1nobile.
The court held;

·'By his O\Vn ad1nission the plaintiff without
\Yarning walked through a line of cars which, until
he en1erged, obscured his movements and stepped
into the center lane of a main highway in front of
a rapidly rnoving automobile which must have been
a plain view but was not seen by him. * * * We are
convinced that he either did not look at all to his
left or if he did he was so inattentive that he
failed to observe the danger which threatened
him and take available precautions for his own
safety. He gave the driver of the approaching
car no time or opportunity to avoid the collision.
It was his own negligence which was the proximate
cause of his injuries."
In view of the aforementioned authorities, it is plain
that \Vhen a person attemp~ts to cross a highway and the
evidence taken most favorably in his behalf shows that he
heedlessly walked into the p·ath of an oncoming vehicle,
he has failed to exercise reasonable care, and that failure
is at least a contributing factor in his injuries. That
principle can have no greater application than to the case
at bar.
While the argument is not made in plaintiff's behalf or raised in the trial court or in her pleadings or
otherwise, it is anticipated that the argument may be
made or the question raised in this court as to whether
the defendant in this case had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, making the question of proximate
c·ause a jury question.
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The doctrine of last clear chance has no application
to a case where, as here, the defendant's negligence continued up to the event out of which the damage or injury
arises. We quote the example given by Justice Wolfe
in Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346 166 P (2) 230, on
page 359 of the Utah Report:
"A defendant is exceeding the lawful restricted speed limit; another driver, the plain tift
fails to keep a proper lookout and crosses the
path of the oncoming car and gets stalled on it~
path. Both up to that point might be guilty of
negligence and neither be able to recover against
the other. But if the oncoming driver, realizing
the situation of the plaintiff, had a clear opportlinity to avoid the accident and failed to utilize
it, that counts just as if the plaintiff had not
been negligent and the defendant had been."
In the Mingus vs. Olsen case, supra, where the evidence would sustain a finding that the deceased had
proceeded 19 feet from the curb of a street into the
street at a speed less than three. miles per hour, and the
defendant approached the point of impact at a speed of
twenty miles per hour, and the defendant could havP
stopped his car had he seen deceased crossing, Justice
Wade in a concurring opinion on page 516 of the lJtah
Report said;
"In the present case, both defendant and
decedent were guilty of the san1e kind of negligence. Each negligently failed to observe the
approach of the other. The negligenee of Paeh
continued to the ti1ne of the accident and either
of the1n could have avoicled the aeeident \vithin
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a Yery 8hort tilne prior to the impact had he
observed the approach of the other. There does
not appear to be any good reason why the last
clear chanee doctrine should allow a recovery
under these circumstances."

In the case of Cox vs. Thompson, supra, this court
said:
·~The

actors negligent conduct is a legal cause
of harn1 to another (himself) if,
(a) His conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm.
(b) There is no rule of law relieving the
actor from liability because of the manner in
\vhich his negligence resulted in the harm."
If decedent had ·yielded the right of way to defendant's automobile or if he had looked up the road and
had seen the ap-proaching car and paid he·ed to the
danger which it presented, the accident would not have
happened. It is patent that the negligence of the decedent was a substantial factor in bringing about his
death,
In this case the plaintiff could have avoided the
accident up to the very instant of the impact had she
been observing the proper care for her own safety by
simply remaining in the center of the street a moment
or two longer and allowing the defendant's vehicle to
pass.
Moreover the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance could
have no application to the evidence of this case s1nce
it does not appear that the defendant had a clear
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opportunity to avoid the accident after he becarne aware
of the plaintiff's position of peril. In the case of Cox
vs. Thompson, supra, the court said:
"The last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable
in the present instance. In order for the question
of last clear chance to he properly submitted to
a jury the evidence must be such as would in all
probability reasonably support a finding that
there was a fair and clear opportunity, in the
exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the injury.
It would not be sufficient that it appear frorn
hindsight that by some possible measure the
defendant by the "skin of his teeth" could have
avoided the injury. See Morby vs. Rogers,
(Utah) 25'2 P 2d 231."
"This court has adopted as the rule in this state the
last clear chance doctrine· of Sections 479 and 480 of the
Restatement of Torts. See Compton et al_ vs. Ogden
Union Ry. (Jfnd Depot Co., supra. Section 480 reads:
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance could have o!bserved the danger
created hy the defendant's negligence in tin1e to
have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if,
but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realized or had reason to
realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing ability to avoid
harming the plain tiff.''
"(See concurring opinion in Morby vs. Rogers, supra,
wherein Section 480 of thP RPstateinent of Torts i~
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di~eussed concerning the apparent need for defendant

to be antecedently negligent and the suggestion therein
made that it is necessary to fran~e a rule in the light
of defendant'~ antecedent negligence.)
HThus the matter was properly withheld from
the jury if the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably
and clearly support a finding that (a) defendant
knew of decedent's situation of danger, and (b)
realized or had reason to realize that plaintiff was
inattentive and unlikely to discover his peril in
time to avoid harm, and (c) the defendant was
. thereafter negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing
ability to avoid harming decedent."
As was said in Compton vs. Ogden Union Ra.ilway
& Depot Co., Utah 235 P 2d 515:
"The rule approved by this court where plaintiff is negligently inattentive and has subjected
himself to risk of harm as provided in Section 480
is that he can recover from a defendant who knew
of his situation and realized or had reason to
realize that plaintiff is inattentive, and unlikely
to discover his peril in time to avoid harm, and
thereafter is negligent in failing to use ordinary
care with the means at his disposal to avoid
harming him. F'or the rule to be otherwise, we
would again only have the negligence of the plaintiff and defendant concurring together to proximately cause the injury. * * *
"In the principal case in order for plaintiffs
to 1nake out a case of last clear chance, it would
have been necessary that the defendant know that
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decedent was in a position of peril, and in addition have realized or had reason to realize that
decedent was inattentive and unlikely to discover
her peril in time to avoid the threatened har1n,
and defendant must thereafter have failed to
exercise reasowable care iln co111nection with its
then existing ability to avoid harming decedent."
(Italics ours.)
Not only must the evidence show that the defendant
had an opportunity to avoid the accident after he
becomes or has reason to be aware of plaintiff's negligence, but the opportunity must he shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
Th~

case of Graha.m v-s. Johnson, 166 Pac. (2d) 230,
109 Utah 346, involved the opportunity of a defendant
to avoid injury to a_ thirteen year old hoy playing ball
in the street. The court said:

" * * * But in the last clear chance doctrine
the word 'clear' has significance. In a case ·such as
this when both parties are more or less rapidly
changing their positions the evidence must be
clear and convincing that the party whom it is
claimed could have avoided the accident had a
'clear' chance to do so.
"Construing any reasonable combination of
facts on this theory of the case most favorable
to Gary, if Darlene was coining at 10 1niles an
hour down the extreme west side of the street
and Donald shout~d at Gary setting hin1 off
tovvard the ear when he, as 1nust in such case btl
inferred, was not then in danger, the jury 1nust
be instructed that it should be clea rlv convinced
in such casP that she was far enough north of
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hin1 a~ to giYe her a rlPar chance to avoid the
accident. '}_"'hat is to say, she must have had a
clear and a1nple opportunity to sense the danger
into "'"hich he '\Vas coming and clearly have had
tiine after that to apply her brakes and stop the
car after she sensed or should reasonably have
sensed that he \vas putting himself into danger.
Other"~ise there is no room for the application of
the last clear chance doctrine. One should not be
held liable for failing to avoid the effect of the
other's negligence in a situation where it is speculatiYe as to ,\~hether he was afforded a clear
opportunity to avoid it. In a situation where Q9th
parties are on the move the significance of the
word 'clear' is most important. Otherwise we
may· put the onus of avoiding the effect of one's
negligence on a party not negligent. That party's
negligence only arises when it is definitely established that there was ample time and opportunity
to avoid the accident which was not taken advantage of."

In analyzing whether or not the defendant had a
clear chance to avoid injury to the plaintiff, after the
plain tiff had placed herself in a perilous position and
defendant had become aware of her situation and what
the defendant did to avoid the accident thereafter, we
must analyze the testimony of ~he defendant himself.
The evidence is that when the defendant reached
the point "Bl" some 50-75 ft. west of the crosswalk
which is still 69 feet west of the point of impact, he
first noted the plaintiff in the center of the highway a.t
point "Sl." When he was at point "B2", still some 15
fPet west of the crosswalk, he honked his horn and
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reduced his speed of his automobile from 25 to 20 1niles
per hour. At that point the plaintiff was still in the
center of the highway. Not until the defendant's vehicle
had reached a point 25-30 feet from the point of impact
did the plaintiff leave the center of the street and start
ac~oss in front of his vehicle. Up to that point, the
defendant had been led to assume by the fact that plaintiff had remained in the center of the street that she
would yield the right of way to his automobile. ''Then
it became apparent that she was not going to yield the
right of way, the defendant immediately applied his
brakes and reduced his speed to one n1ile per hour, continuing on only 3 feet beyond the point of hnpact.
Moreover, we need not rely on the defendanfs version
entirely since it is cooberated by the testimony of the
indep·endent witnesses. Both Frank Bonner and Charles
Sweet testified that the plaintiff hesitated in the center
of the highway. Charles s,veat testiifed that the defendant's vehicle was only five feet from the plaintiff at
the tin1e she crossed in front of the defendant's vehicle.
It is apparent from the fact that the defendant had
almost entirely stopped his vehicle at the point of i1npact
that he did all that might he reasonable and expected
of him to avoid injury .to the plaintiff after he becan1e
aware of her situation. In fact, analyzing the defendant'~
testimony it is apparent that not only was he not nPgligent after he became aware of plaintiff's position of
peril, but that he was not negligent in any respect at
any time. There is no evidence that he was travelin!~
at a high or unreasonable rate of speed. ~'here i~ no
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evidence tlutt he failed to see the plaintiff on the high'v-ay. He undertook to warn the plaintiff of the a.p·p·roa.ch
of his auton1obile by honking his horn. He continually
\\Tatched the plaintiff on the highway. He was led by
her actions to believe that she was not going to yield
the right of 'Yay. He did everything that might be
reasonably expected to avoid hitting her. It is submitted
therefore that not only does the evidence fail to show
that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care
after he disco\yered the plaintiff in a position of peril
by reason of her O\Vn negligence, but that there is no
evidence that he at any tin1e was guilty of negligence.

CONCLUSION
The trial judge in an action brought to recover
damages by reason of the negligence of another should
not take the issue of contributory negligence from the
jury if there is a reasonable basis upon which reasonable
n1inds might conclude that they are not convinced by
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence or that such negligence proximately caused the injury for which the plaintiff is seeking to recover. The evidence in this case, taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, leaves no reasonable
doubt that the plaintiff was· guilty of contributory negligence and that such negligence proximately contributed
to her own injury.
The evidence shows that, even though the plaintiff
with very little inconvenience to herself could not have
proceeded directly across the street within the confines
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of a marked crosswalk, in which event she \vould have
preference over vehicles using said highway. Plaintiff
chose to leave the comparative safety of the cross"Talk
and to cross the highway at a point where vehicles had
the preferred status and she was required to yield the
right of way under section 41-6-79, Utah Code Annotated
19'53.
The evidence further shows that the plaintiff had
every opportunity to observe the approach of the defendant's automobile and that she either failed to observe
the automobile or, o:bserving it, was heedless of the
danger involved and crossed directly in front of the
automobile. Except for her failure to observe and yield
the right of way to the defendant's automobile, thi~
accident would not have happened. Her conduct was an
integral part of the casual factors giving rise to her
own injuries which were a proximate and natural result
of such conduct.
The defendant had no reason to believe that the
plaintiff would cross in front of his vehicle, but on the
contrary, had a right to assume and indeed was led to
believe by the plaintiff's own conduct, in hesitating in
the center of the highway, that the plaintiff would yield
the right of way to his vehicle. When it became apparent
to him that the plaintiff did not intend to so yiPld thr
right of way, he applied his brakes and took all reasonable precaution to avoid the accident so suece~~fully
that had the plaintiff been three feet further Pa~t on
the highway, his efforts would have been succe~~f~l.
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that the court
did not err in directing a verdict against the plaintiff,
but that the status of the evidence directed that he do so.
Respectfully

submit~ed,

STEWART, CANNO·N & HANSON
.By

EDWIN B. CANNON

J. HANSON
DoN J. HANSON
ERNEST F. BALDWIN' JR.

REx
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